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Abstract—In light of ever-increasing scale and sophistication
of modern DDoS attacks, it is time to revisit in-network filtering or
the idea of empowering DDoS victims to install in-network traffic
filters in the upstream transit networks. Recent proposals show
that filtering DDoS traffic at a handful of large transit networks
can handle volumetric DDoS attacks effectively. However, the in-
network filtering primitive can also be misused. Transit networks
can use the in-network filtering service as an excuse for any
arbitrary packet drops made for their own benefit. For example,
transit networks may intentionally execute filtering services
poorly or unfairly to discriminate their competing neighbor
ASes while claiming that they drop packets for the sake of
DDoS defense. We argue that it is due to the lack of verifiable
filtering — i.e., no one can check if a transit network executes
the filter rules correctly as requested by the DDoS victims. To
make in-network filtering a more robust defense primitive, in
this paper, we propose a verifiable in-network filtering, called
VIF, that exploits emerging hardware-based trusted execution
environments (TEEs) and offers filtering verifiability to DDoS
victims and neighbor ASes. Our proof of concept demonstrates
that a VIF filter implementation on commodity servers with TEE
support can handle traffic at line rate (e.g., 10 Gb/s) and execute
up to 3,000 filter rules. We show that VIF can easily scale to
handle larger traffic volume (e.g., 500 Gb/s) and more complex
filtering operations (e.g., 150,000 filter rules) by parallelizing the
TEE-based filters. As a practical deployment model, we suggest
that Internet exchange points (IXPs) are the ideal candidates for
the early adopters of our verifiable filters due to their central
locations and flexible software-defined architecture. Our large-
scale simulations of two realistic attacks (i.e., DNS amplification,
Mirai-based flooding) show that only a small number (e.g., 5–
25) of large IXPs are needed to offer the VIF filtering service to
handle the majority (e.g., up to 80–90%) of DDoS traffic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks are highly
prevalent. In the last decade, new attack strategies such as am-
plification [59] and new attack sources such as IoT devices [73]
have surfaced, which have resulted in attacks of extremely high
volume [71].
A large number of DDoS defenses have been extensively
studied over the past two decades. Among them, an effective
defense against the ever-increasing scale of DDoS attacks is in-
network filtering or empowering DDoS victim networks to in-
stall in-network traffic filters in the upstream transit networks.
This idea was proposed in early efforts (e.g., Pushback [47],
D-WARD [49], AITF [9]) and has repeatedly re-surfaced in
standardization committees (e.g., see the recent DDoS Open
Threat Signaling [51]).
Dropping suspicious packets closer to the attack sources at
the requests of DDoS victims is desirable because it (1) reduces
wasted traffic on downstream ISPs, thereby reducing overall
network bandwidth and cost of routing malicious traffic; and
(2) has the potential to handle ever-increasing attack volume
(e.g., several Tb/s) since attack volume at each distributed
filtering point can be much lower than the aggregated volume
at the victim [9].
Unsurprisingly, there is renewed interest in the community
on revisiting in-network filtering solutions. Indeed, a recent
DDoS defense architecture, called SENSS [58], suggests that
the traffic filters installed at a few large transit ISPs directly by
the remote DDoS victims can prevent most of the volumetric
attack traffic from flooding the victim networks.
However, the in-network filtering primitive can be un-
fortunately misused by malicious transit networks. Transit
networks may claim to provide in-network filtering service on
behalf of a remote DDoS victim only to justify any arbitrary
packet drops executed for their own benefit. For example, a
transit network that offers in-network filtering service (which
we call a filtering network) can easily compromise a filter
rule [Drop 50% of HTTP flows destined to the
victim network] requested by a DDoS victim to harm its
neighbor networks, as illustrated in Figure 1. First, the mali-
cious filtering network can silently discriminate its neighbor
upstream ASes by applying arbitrarily modified filter rules
(e.g., dropping 80% of HTTP traffic from AS A but only
20% from AS B) based on its business preference (say, AS
A is AT&T and B is Comcast). Discrimination and dispute
among transit ISPs are not a new problem (e.g., a dispute
between Level3 and Comcast [76]); however, it can be easily
exacerbated if transit networks start dropping packets for
the sake of DDoS defense. Worse yet, the filtering network
can also perform the requested filter rules inaccurately (e.g.,
drop only 20% HTTP traffic on average) to save its filtering
resources while claiming the faithful execution of the requested
rules.
We argue that the verifiability of in-network filtering
mitigates such misbehaviors by malicious filtering service
providers. With filtering verifiability, when a filtering network
executes a manipulated filter rule, the DDoS victim network
who requested the filter rule or the direct neighbor autonomous
system (ASes) of the filtering network can detect the misbe-
havior immediately.
In this paper, we offer the first technical means of the strong
verifiability of filtering operations and develop a practical
and scalable in-network filtering system, called VIF.1 VIF
has a generic architecture designed for any transit networks
(e.g., Tier-1, large Tier-2 ISPs, IXPs). We exploit software
1VIF stands for ‘Verifiable In-network Filtering’.
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Fig. 1: Example of in-network filtering in a transit network.
VIF enables the direct upstream neighbors/the DDoS victim
to verify if the filtering network executes the requested filter
rules correctly.
networking functions running on commodity hardware with
trusted execution environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX [20]
and Arm TrustZone [10], which are widely available in com-
mercial off-the-shelf (COTS) server platforms; see Microsoft
and Google’s SGX-based cloud platforms [56], [60].
We identify two key technical challenges to realizing the
VIF vision in practice:
• Auditability. To make the in-network filtering verifiable, we
exploit the trusted execution environment with hardware-
based root of trust (e.g., Intel SGX) and provide integrity
guarantee for filter logic. Yet, achieving auditable filtering
operations is not trivial. One challenge is that the correct
filtering operations are also affected by external inputs to
the filter (e.g., incoming packet order, time clock feeds),
which can be controlled by a malicious filtering network.
Another challenge is that a malicious filtering network can
still bypass the auditable filters by reconfiguring its network
and avoid using the auditable filters for adversary-selected
packets.
• Scalability. To scale out the filter capacity for large volu-
metric attacks, parallelization with multiple TEE-based au-
ditable filters is required; however, some necessary network
components for parallelization (e.g., traffic load balancers)
are not directly auditable. Moreover, distributing filter rules
across multiple auditable filters creates an optimization
challenge, which involves two dimensions of resource con-
straints.
Approach and Contributions. VIF’s design makes the fol-
lowing key contributions to address these aforementioned
challenges:
• We analyze the requirements for auditable filters, particu-
larly, their reliance on the external inputs to the filters, which
can be controlled by malicious filtering networks (§III-A).
Our key insight is that it is sufficient that traffic filters are
stateless for auditable filter operations. We also implement
an effective bypass detection that relies on the account-
able packet logs (with an efficient sketch implementation)
measured inside the TEE (§III-B). The packet logs can be
used to identify packet drops/injections made outside of the
auditable filters. We demonstrate that an efficient line-rate
implementation (nearly 10 Gb/s throughput performance) of
the auditable traffic filters with the TEE support is possible
with several system optimizations (§V); and
• For highly scalable filtering architecture, we implement a
dynamic filter rule distribution algorithm across multiple
auditable filters and untrusted network components [26],
[54] (§IV). We implement a heuristic that can quickly
reconfigure a large number of filter rules (e.g., 150,000 filter
rules) and a large volume of incoming traffic (e.g., the total
volume of 500 Gb/s) with auditable filter instances (e.g., 50
filters).
As an early deployment model, we suggest to deploy VIF
in major Internet exchange points (IXPs) (§VI). In the last
decade, IXPs have become the central infrastructure of the
global Internet connectivity [7], [15], with large IXPs handling
daily traffic volumes comparable to those carried by the largest
Tier-1 ISPs, which makes the IXPs the perfect candidates
for our verifiable filtering service [23]. We perform large-
scale inter-domain simulations with two realistic attacks (i.e.,
DNS amplification, Mirai-based DDoS attacks) and show that
deploying VIF in a small number (e.g., 5–25) of large IXPs
is enough to handle the majority (e.g., up to 90%) of DDoS
attacks (§VI-C).
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this section, we describe the threat model we consider
in this paper (§II-A), the desired properties of the VIF design,
the trusted execution environment model (§II-C) (§II-B) and
the assumption we make in this work (§II-D).
A. Threat Model
We consider a single malicious transit network that offers
in-network filtering services for downstream networks. In this
threat model, the adversary has full control of the control plane
and data plane within its network.
Our threat model focuses on the problem of the malicious
filtering network manipulating the DDoS-victim-submitted fil-
ter rules, which we call as filter rule violation attacks. In
general, let us consider a filter rule R requested by a victim
network. The malicious filtering network may change R arbi-
trarily into a different filter rule R′ and apply it to all traffic
destined to the victim network. Also, the malicious filtering
network may apply different modified rules R′1, R
′
2, · · · for
different traffic flows (e.g., packets delivered via different
neighboring ASes).
In the followings, we present two example attack goals,
where the manipulation of filter rules at a filtering network
can seriously disrupt the packet forwarding services for the
neighboring ASes and the remote DDoS victim networks. In
both attacks, we use the same example as in Section I, i.e.,
the filtering network manipulates the DDoS-victim-submitted
filter rule R =[Drop 50% of HTTP flows destined
to victim network].
[Goal 1] Discriminating neighboring ASes. ASes expect
their traffic to be reliably forwarded by the transit networks.
Yet, when a transit network offers the filtering services for
the sake of DDoS defense, the packet forwarding service
can be silently degraded differently for different neighbor-
ing upstream ASes. In particular, the filtering network can
apply the modified filter rules for each neighboring AS
based on its own business preference. Instead of applying
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the same original rule R, the filtering network may ap-
ply R′A =[Drop 20% of HTTP flows destined to
victim network] for traffic flows delivered by AS A
and R′B =[Drop 80% of HTTP flows destined to
victim network] for traffic flows delivered by AS B.
Such discriminatory filtering is hard to detect because individ-
ual neighbor AS A and B do not know the unmodified rule R
and, even if they know R, they cannot determine if the traffic
filter applied to their packets is R. Each neighbor AS may
try to infer the packet drops of the end-to-end path indirectly
(e.g., via monitoring TCP sessions); yet, it is insufficient
because pinpointing exact location of packet losses (a.k.a. fault
localization) is known to be hard without large-scale network
collaboration [8], [12].
[Goal 2] Reducing operational cost with inaccurate filter-
ing. To reduce the operational cost, the malicious filtering
network may violate the filter rules submitted by the DDoS
victims. For instance, consider that the malicious filtering
network wants to use only 10 Gb/s of its filtering capacity for
the rule R while total incoming traffic of 50 Gb/s should be
sent to the filters. To achieve this, the filtering network can send
only 10 Gb/s traffic to its filters and execute the unmodified
rule R. For the rest of the 40 Gb/s traffic, however, the filtering
network can simply allow or drop all without using the filtering
capacity. Since the victim network has no information about
the incoming traffic arrived at the filtering network, it cannot
directly detect this attack.
B. Desired Properties: Filtering Verifiability and Scalability
As we introduced in the Introduction, we have the two
desired properties of the VIF design. First, to remove the attack
capabilities required for the filter-rule violation attacks, VIF
desires to have the filtering verifiability. A filter rule R is
said to be verifiable if any modification of the rule R and
its execution by the filtering network can be detected by the
victim networks or the direct neighboring ASes. Second, our
VIF system must be easily scaled up because DDoS attacks
are increasingly scalable in both volume and complexity. We
have observed an escalation in the volume of DDoS attack
traffic [68], [73] and attacks are getting more sophisticated;
e.g., multi-million bots are becoming more common [5].
C. Trusted Execution Environment with Intel SGX
VIF uses TEEs, particularly Intel SGX in this work, as the
feasible hardware-based root of trust. Intel Software Guard
Extensions (SGX) is a recent architectural feature that allows
secure execution of a program on a computing infrastructure in
control of an adversarial operator [20], [48]. SGX also supports
secure execution of a user-level program with no modification
of underlying commodity software stacks [11], [13], [65]. In
particular, it offers the isolated execution of the application
logic in a protected memory region, called an enclave, which
prevents the operator from tampering it. Moreover, it supports
remote attestation that allows a third party to audit that the
correct application and data has been loaded in an enclave.
The attestation process starts when a verifier issues an at-
testation challenge to the enclaved application. The enclave
then provides a report, which is cryptographically signed with
the attestation key of the SGX hardware. Next, the attestation
report is verified by the Intel Attestation Service (IAS), which
is distributed globally [38]. Recently, Intel also allows anyone,
who gets a certificate from Intel, to run their own remote
attestation services and verify the attestation report [61].
D. Assumptions
We assume that ISPs (e.g., victim networks) trust the
remote attestation process for the integrity guarantees of the
VIF enclave. We also assume an idealized implementation
of VIF that has no backdoor. The full implementation of
VIF is open-sourced for public scrutiny2. We leave a formal
verification of VIF implementation as future work. We consider
all hardware and side-channel attacks (e.g., [31], [36], [44])
as out of scope of this paper since countermeasures to these
(e.g., [17], [21], [32], [63], [64], [67]) are orthogonal to the
design of VIF.
III. AUDITABLE FILTER DESIGN
The VIF filtering operation is enclosed by an SGX enclave
where the integrity of its execution is guaranteed, i.e., a
malicious filtering network cannot tamper it. Furthermore, the
filtering internal logic and states are also securely verified via
the remote attestation process [38]. The isolated execution and
remote attestation are useful in realizing the auditable filter;
yet, they are insufficient because (1) the filtering decisions
can be influenced by the external inputs to the filter such as
packet order and time clock feeds, which are controlled by the
filtering network; and (2) the malicious filtering network may
redirect the traffic within its network to bypass the filtering
operations.
To address these two challenges, we propose the filtering
operations to be stateless and hence be independent from the
external inputs (§III-A) and implement the enclaved packet
logs to detect bypassing attempts (§III-B).
A. Stateless Filter Design
To analyze the dependencies of the enclaved filters, let us
first describe an abstract model for our enclaved filter f :
{ALLOW,DROP} ← f(〈p, a〉, (〈p1, a1〉, 〈p2, a2〉, · · · )), (1)
where 〈pi, ai〉 denotes that packet pi arrives at the enclaved
filter at time ai (measured by the enclave’s internal clock),
〈p, a〉 represents the packet p that is being evaluated and its
arrival time a, and the following time relationship holds a >
a1 ≥ a2 ≥ · · · .
Notice that in this abstract model, the filtering operation of
a packet p depends on the packet arrival time and the order of
the packets, which can be exploited by the filtering network
(see next). Here, we summarize the two properties that are
needed to make VIF filter auditable:
• Arrival-time independence. The filtering decision should be
independent of packet-arrival time because it can be easily
manipulated by a malicious filtering network (e.g., delaying
individual data packets). Moreover, a malicious filtering
network can delay the time query/response messages to/from
the trusted clock source for the enclave [4], slowing down
the enclave’s internal time clock.
2VIF is open sourced at https://github.com/InNetworkFiltering/SGX-DPDK
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• Packet-injection independence. The filtering decision should
not depend on the previous packets since a malicious
filtering network can also inject any arbitrary packets into
the traffic flow and influence the filtering decision.
Thus, to ensure that the filtering operations are auditable,
the filtering function f can be independent of all the previous
packets and their arrival times; that is,
f
(〈p, a〉, (〈p1, a1〉, 〈p2, a2〉, · · · )) = f(p), (2)
which simplifies the filter design to n-tuple (e.g., srcIP,
dstIP, srcPort, dstPort, protocol) per-packet
filters. In other words, the filtering decision of packet p solely
relies on p, such as five-tuple bits. While we acknowledge
the limitations of such a simple n-tuple filter design (e.g.,
incapable of handling complicated application-level DoS at-
tacks), we note that it is sufficient for handling large volumetric
attacks that are in imminent need of in-network filtering.
Particularly, for handling volumetric attacks, we allow
victim networks to express filter rules for exact-match five-
tuple flows (e.g., a specific TCP flow between two hosts)
or coarse-grained flow specifications (e.g., HTTP connections
from hosts in a /24 prefix). Details for several practical design
points for our enclaved filter are found in Appendix A.
B. Filter Bypass Detection
The auditability of the VIF filter guarantees that the fil-
ter operates correctly for the given packets from a filtering
network to a victim network. However, packets may not be
properly filtered when a malicious filtering network configures
the traffic to bypass the VIF filter, hence violating the filter
rules. Particularly, the manipulation of the traffic flows happen
outside of the protected enclave and thus cannot be detected by
the auditable VIF filter itself. We categorize the filter bypass
attacks as follows:
• Injection after filtering: The VIF filter drops a packet p but
the adversary injects a copy of p into the packet stream that
is forwarded to the victim;
• Drop after filtering: A packet p is allowed by the filter but
the adversary drops p before forwarding it to the victim; and
• Drop before filtering: The filtering network drops a packet
p even before it is processed by the filter.
Note that, we do not consider injection before filtering
operations by a filtering network as an attack because it does
not affect the filtering decision due to the packet-injection
independence property of the filters (see Section III-A).3
Bypass Detection. We allow the victim network and the
neighboring ASes of the filtering network to detect such bypass
attempts by implementing the accountable packet logs inside
the enclave for incoming and outgoing packet streams, see
Figure 2. For each packet log, we utilize a sketch, particularly
a count-min sketch, a memory-efficient data structure that
stores summaries of streaming data [19]. With the sketch-based
packet logging, the VIF filter keeps only the measurement
summary inside an enclave and significantly minimize the
memory footprint; e.g., less than 1 MB per each sketch. With
3Moreover, the detection of packet injections before the enclave operations
is hard without explicit coordination with traffic sources.
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Fig. 2: Bypass detection. Efficient sketch data structure is used
for packet logs.
some additional data-plane optimizations (see Section V-A),
the computational overhead of computing two sketches per
packet is negligible (see Section V-B).
To detect bypass attempts by the filtering network, the
victim network queries the authenticated outgoing packet logs
from the VIF enclave and compares it with its own local sketch.
Any discrepancy between the two sketches implies injection
after filter and/or drop after filter attacks by the filtering
network. The computation and bandwidth overhead for the
logs queries is negligible; i.e., sketching is highly efficient and
requires sending only a few MB of sketch memory via the
already established channel with the victim network. 4 When
the victim network detects any bypass attempt, it can decide to
abort the ongoing filtering request with the filtering network.
In practice, the VIF filtering network should allow a short (e.g.,
a few minutes) time duration for each filtering round so that
victim networks can abort any further request quickly when it
detects any bypass attempts.
Similarly, individual neighbor ASes of the filtering network
can detect the drop before filtering attacks by comparing their
own local packet logs with the authenticated incoming packet
logs of the VIF filter. As a result, the neighboring ASes can
choose another downstream network when they obtain the
evidence that their downstream network offers filtering services
but intentionally drops their packets before they reach the VIF
filters.
Handling malicious intermediate ASes. The bypass detection
mechanism may cause false positives when some packets are
dropped after leaving the VIF filter but before reaching the
victim network. When this happens, the victim network cannot
accurately pinpoint where the packet drop has happened. The
packet could have been dropped by one of the intermediate
transit networks between the VIF filtering network and the
victim network, or by the VIF filtering network itself. This,
often-called, fault localization is known to be difficult unless
all the networks (including the VIF filtering network, the
victim network, and intermediate ASes) collaborate [8], [12].
However, such large-scale collaboration is unlikely in today’s
Internet.
Therefore, instead of locating such packet drops, VIF
allows the victim network to dynamically test all the inter-
mediate ASes by rerouting its inbound traffic to avoid each of
ASes being tested in a short time using the well-known BGP
poisoning-based techniques (e.g., [39], [66]). Due to the space
constraint, we describe the detailed test steps in Appendix B.
4The computational overhead of the victim network should also be low
since it only requires an efficient sketch on a commodity server without SGX
overhead.
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Fig. 3: Filter throughput degradation for increasing number of
filtering rules
IV. SCALABLE FILTER DESIGN
In this section, we first analyze the performance (e.g.,
throughput, network I/O) bottlenecks of a single auditable
filter (§IV-A) and then describe a scalable filtering design with
multiple enclaved filters running in parallel and an untrusted
load balancer (§IV-B).
A. Bottlenecks: Maximum Bandwidth and Number of Rules
per SGX Filter
Recent works such as mbTLS have demonstrated the
10Gb/s performance per enclave can be reached with a four
SGX cores machine [52]. Although the processors with six or
more cores available on the market 5 may support larger band-
width, we consider the maximum network I/O performance of
each SGX enclave is 10 Gb/s in the rest of the paper.
Since the SGX-based filter must match the installed rules
with incoming flows to perform filtering, the number of
filter rules naturally becomes the bottleneck of the filter’s
performance. Indeed, we measure the throughput of traffic
processed by a single enclaved filter with different numbers
of filter rules and show the results in Figure 3a. We can see
from Figure 3a that when the number of filter rules exceeds
approximately 3,000, the VIF filter’s throughput performance
rapidly degrades.
One of the explanation is that, when the number of filter
rules increases, the lookup table for the packet processing
inside an SGX enclave also grows accordingly. Even when we
use the state-of-the-art multi-bit tries data structure for looking
up the filter rules (see Section V for details), the memory size
of the lookup table still grows linearly with the number of
filter rules, as shown in Figure 3b. This result also confirms
the Enclave Page Cache (EPC) limit is around 92 MB, as seen
in many other works (e.g., [42]).
B. Scalable Filtering with Multiple SGX Filters
Given the architectural limitation of secure computing
resources in currently available SGX architecture, the single-
enclave filtering deployment may not be able to deal with the
increasing attack volume and complexity. Hence, we propose a
generic VIF architecture that can easily scale up as the number
of filters grows, as shown in Figure 4. The scalable VIF design
includes multiple enclaved filters running in parallel and some
5List of SGX-enabled processors is available at: ark.intel.com.
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Fig. 4: Scalable VIF architecture. Multiple VIF enclaves are
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Fig. 5: Protocol for filter rule recalculation and redistribution
across three enclaved filters: E0, E1, and E2.
untrusted facilitating components such as the high-bandwidth
switching fabric and the controller.
In the followings, we describe how filter rules are dis-
tributed and dynamically adjusted among multiple enclaves
and explain why a malicious filtering network cannot exploit
the untrusted components to manipulate the filtering opera-
tions.
Filter rules distribution protocol. Since the traffic flows
being filtered are frequently changed, the filter rules also need
to be updated and redistributed among filters accordingly. We
consider the filter rules distribution happens in rounds, i.e.,
the entire filter rule set is given and does not change until
the next rule reconfiguration is executed. In each round, the
filter rules are calculated and redistributed via a simple master-
slave topology among multiple enclaved filters. We illustrate
the protocol in Figure 5, where we have filter E0 as the
master node and E1, E2 as the slave nodes. In particular, when
reconfiguration of filter rules is desired (e.g., traffic volume or
the number of filter rules handled by a certain filter exceeds a
threshold), any enclaved filter may initiate a rule redistribution
round and become the master node. Then, all the slave nodes
upload their filter rule sets (Ri for Ei) and the array of the
average received flow rates of each rule set Ri (Bi for Ei)
to the master node. The master node calculates re-configured
filter rules, which then be redistributed to all the slave nodes
and the load balancer. If the calculation requires the changes
to the number of enclaves, necessary additional steps (e.g.,
creating and attesting more enclaved filters) may be required
before the rule redistribution.
Filter rules calculation optimization problem. In each fil-
ter rules redistribution, the master node has to allocate the
bandwidth and rules to all enclaved filters. We consider the
calculation of the optimal rule sets for each filter enclave as
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solving a mixed integer linear programming (ILP) optimization
problem. We assume k filter rules as ri (1 ≤ i ≤ k) and the
corresponding incoming bandwidth as bi (1 ≤ i ≤ k).6 A
single enclave has the memory limit M (e.g., 92 MB) and the
bandwidth capacity G (e.g., 10 Gb/s) as we have discussed in
Section IV-A. Then, we can decide the minimum number of
enclaves as needed as nmin = dmax
(
1
G
∑k
i=1 bi,
ku
M−v
)
e. To
allow some space for optimization, the number of enclaves is
taken as n = dmax
(
1
G
∑k
i=1 bi,
ku
M−v
)
×(1+λ)e where λ ≥ 0
is an adjustable parameter for additional enclaves. We define
real-valued variables xi,j (1≤i≤k,1≤j≤n) denoting the portion
of bandwidth bi allocated to the j-th enclave, and binary
variables yi,j (1≤i≤k,1≤j≤n) representing if rule ri is installed
on the j-th enclave (i.e., yi,j = 1). Based on the allocation plan
indicated by xi,j and yi,j , we consider Cj = u ×
∑
i
yi,j + v
as the memory cost function, which is a linear function of
the number of rules installed (where u, v are constants). Also,
Ij =
∑
i
xi,jyi,j is considered as the allocated bandwidth. We
present the detailed ILP formulation in Appendix C.
Greedy algorithm to calculate filter rules. Solving the above-
mentioned optimization problem is inherently costly when k×
n is large (e.g. > 10K). Thus, we propose a greedy algorithm
(see Appendix D) that finds a sub-optional solution within a
reasonably short time period. The high-level intuition of the
greedy algorithm is to pre-compute the two parameters—(1)
the number of rules per enclave h and (2) the bandwidth quota
per enclave g—and arrange the rules and bandwidths for the
obtained two parameters heuristically.
Detecting misbehavior of untrusted components. The load
balancer and other components outside of the enclave are
untrusted and may misbehave. For example, the load balancer
may redirect to a filter the traffic flows that do not match
with the filter rules assigned for that filter. However, these
misbehaviors can be easily detected by each filter by checking
if it receives any packets that do not match the rules it
receives from the master node. Each enclave detects such load-
balancing misbehavior, and reports it to the DDoS victim.
Note that if the load balancer drops the traffic flows that are
supposed to be redirected to an enclave, it can be detected by
the bypass detection of the auditable filters (see Section III).
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
We implement a proof of concept of the VIF filter using
SGX and various optimizations (§V-A) and then evaluate its
data-plane (§V-B) and scalability performance (§V-C) for large
attack volume and complexity.
A. Implementation
Overview. We build the VIF filter as a Linux userspace appli-
cation with Intel SGX SDK 2.1 and DPDK 17.05.2 for high-
speed packet processing. Figure 6 shows the main components
of the VIF filter and the minimal trusted computing base
6We denote bi as the incoming bandwidth measured for a filter rule for eas-
ier understanding. In practice, each enclave would produce byte counts without
timestamping them because their individual clock sources are untrusted (see
Section III-A). The byte counts are then collected in a timely manner and
used for the optimization problem.
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Fig. 7: Two packet copy approaches for the auditable filter and
packet logs. In the near zero-copy approach, we copy only the
memory reference (∗), the five tuple (5T ), and the size (s) of
the packet into the enclave.
(TCB) of code and data inside the enclave, which includes the
entire control-plane and the key parts of the data-plane logic
(e.g., packet logging and filtering). The control plane performs
remote attestation and manages the keys for communication
with a DDoS victim. The design of the data plane follows
DPDK pipeline model, where three threads (i.e., RX thread,
Filter thread, and TX thread) run on individual CPU cores and
packets are passed between cores via DPDK lockless rings
(i.e., RX ring, DROP ring, and TX ring). Every thread runs
a small loop polling the hardware or software buffers in the
previous stage, processes a batch of the packets, and passes it
to the next stage in the pipeline.
Optimization: Near zero-copy design. For every incoming
data-plane packet, a VIF filter logs the packet, filters it
based on the given filter rule set, and logs it again if it
is allowed by the filter, as shown in Figure 7. Figure 7(a)
shows a naive approach, where a VIF filter makes the entire
copy of incoming packets into the enclave and operate these
functions over the packet copies inside the enclave. This full-
packet copy approach can be considered as the baseline packet
processing mechanism of other existing SGX-based middlebox
applications (e.g., Tor nodes [40], [65], TLS middleboxes [30],
[37], [52], inter-domain routing [18], [41], and IDSs [30], [62],
[70]), where secure operations over the full packet bytes are
required (e.g., full packet read or encryption). However, this
approach may incur too much overhead when performing line-
rate processing due to the remaining EPC memory for a VIF
filter is only about 92 MB.
We thus minimize the dynamic memory usage and avoid
the paging by copying only certain header fields into the
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enclave, which we call near zero-copy optimization. This
allows more memory space for filter rules and the lookup table.
In particular, only a fraction of each packet’s header fields (i.e.,
the five tuple fields, 5T , and the packet size, s) are copied into
the enclave memory along with the memory reference (∗) of
the packet, as shown in Figure 7(b). 7 The copied data 〈5T, s〉
represents the packet and is used for the logging functions and
the filter operation. The memory reference ∗ is used to perform
the corresponding operation (e.g., allow or drop) for the packet
in the untrusted memory pool.
With the copied five tuple and the size, we first log each
packet using a count-min sketch [19] (with 2 independent
linear hash functions, 64K sketch bins, and 64 bit counters)
for memory efficient (e.g., 1 MB) per-source-IP counters. The
per-source-IP sketch for the incoming packets enables each
neighboring ISPs of the filtering network to detect the ‘drop
before filtering’ bypass attack discussed in Section III-B. For
forwarded packets, we also record another count-min sketch
based on the full 5-tuple bits so that the victim network can
detect bypass attempts. The latency increased by the two sketch
operations is negligible because only 4 linear hash function
operations are conducted in the data-plane path. Each counter
has 64 bits and takes only around 1 MB EPC memory per
instance of the count-min sketch.
Optimization: Reducing the number of context switches.
Another major overhead stems from the context switches
when user application calls the enclave functions (ECall) or
the enclaved function calls the outside functions (OCall). We
address this performance degradation by reducing both types
of calls in the filter thread: (1) VIF only needs one ECall
to launch the filter thread and initiates its polling; and (2) the
filter thread makes no OCalls as the communication with other
threads relies only on the software rings.
Trusted computing base (TCB). Beyond the DPDK library
containing about 64K source lines of code (SLoC), our VIF
filter contributes to the TCB only 1,206 SLoC which includes
the modification of DPDK ip_pipeline (1044 SLoC) and
the packet logging and near zero-copy functions (162 SLoC).
B. Line-rate Data-plane Performance
Testbed Setup. We test our implementation with two ma-
chines: one is a packet generator and one deploys VIF filter.
The packet generator has an Intel E5-2630 v3 CPU (2.40 GHz,
8 cores) and 32 GB memory. The filtering machine has an Intel
i7-6700 CPU (3.40 GHz, 4 cores) and 8 GB memory. Both
have 10 GbE Intel X540-AT2 network cards and run Ubuntu
16.04.3 LTS with Linux kernel 4.10. On the packet generator
machine, we use pktgen-dpdk 3.4.2 to generate the traffic
saturating the 10 Gb/s link between the two machines.
Throughput Performance. We benchmark the maximum
throughput performance of the filter with the packet size of
64, 128, 256, 512, 1024, and 1500 bytes for three different
versions of the VIF filter implementations: (1) native filter
without SGX, (2) SGX-based filter with full packet copy, and
(3) SGX-based filter with near zero-copy.
7Such reduction of byte copies is allowed for our auditable filter applications
but this does not necessarily apply to any other SGX-based middlebox
applications.
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Fig. 8: Throughput performance in bit-per-second for varying
packet sizes and 3,000 rules with three implementation ver-
sions: (1) Native (no SGX), (2) SGX with full packet copy,
and (3) SGX with near zero copy.
Figure 8 shows the throughput performance for varying
packet sizes for the three implementations. For the packet
sizes of 256 Byte or larger, all the three implementations
achieve the full line-rate of 10 Gb/s. With small packet sizes,
however, we observe some degradation due to the use of
SGX. Particularly, when we make full packet copies for each
incoming packet, the filter experiences significant throughput
degradation. The near zero-copy implementation demonstrates
8 Gb/s throughput performance even with 64 Byte packets
and 3,000 filter rules. Additionally, we present the experiment
results of VIF evaluation in packet per second metric in
Appendix E.
Latency Performance. We also measured the latency for the
near zero-copy version with various packet size starting from
128 bytes. The results are 34 µs (128 bytes), 38 µs (256 bytes),
52 µs (512 bytes), 80 µs (1024 bytes), 107 µs (1500 bytes). All
the measurements are average latency over 10-second run with
8 Gb/s constant traffic load, which are reported by pktgen’s
latency measurement function.
Connection-Preserving Filtering Performance. We evaluate
the detailed performance of connection-preserving filtering.
We present the result in Appendix F.
Remote attestation performance. Our detailed remote attes-
tation performance can be found in Appendix G.
C. Scalable Filter Rule Distribution
We evaluate the solving performance of the mixed ILP
optimization problem described in Section IV-B with the
CPLEX solver in a server-grade machine with 20 cores. We
use 3,000 or more filter rules that would cause the throughput
degradation of each VIF filter. In this evaluation, we consider
that the total traffic rate going through the entire VIF filter
is 100 Gb/s. The incoming traffic distribution across the filter
rules follows a lognormal distribution.
With the number of rules more than 3,000 and the number
of enclaves more than 10, we find that the CPLEX’s mixed
ILP solver cannot return the optimal solutions within any
reasonable time period. To evaluate the effectiveness of our
greedy algorithm in Section IV-B, that is, how close it is to
the optimal solutions, we use a small number of filter rules
(10 ≤ k ≤ 15) and confirm that the difference between the
optimal cost function calculated by the CPLEX’s mixed ILP
solver and the results from our greedy algorithm is only 5.2%.
We now compare the execution time of the CPLEX’s mixed
ILP solver and our greedy algorithm when the number of rules
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TABLE I: Execution times for the ILP solution and the
greedy algorithm solution. The CPLEX’s mixed ILP solver
is configured to stop when found sub-optimal solutions.
Number of rules (k) CPLEX (sub-optimal) Greedy
5,000 210.49s 0.31s
10,000 772.43s 0.50s
15,000 1,614.96s 0.73s
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Fig. 9: Average time taken (in second) to complete the heuristic
algorithm for optimizing filter rules across multiple enclaves
for varying number of rules k.
is between 5,000 and 15,000 and show the results in Table I.
To measure the execution time of the CPLEX’s mixed ILP
solver for our optimization problem, we configure the solver
to stop earlier when it finds a first, sub-optimal solution. As
shown in Table I, the CPLEX solver even requires about 200
– 1,600 seconds to find the sub-optimal solutions, which are
unacceptably slow for the dynamic filter rules redistribution
operations. On the other hand, our greedy algorithm runs three
orders of magnitude faster than the CPLEX solver with the
same number of filter rules.
Figure 9 shows the extended experiments on the execution
times of the greedy algorithm for varying number of rules at a
much larger range. We also run this experiment with the total
traffic bandwidth of 500 Gb/s, which follows the log-normal
distribution. In all the range we test (10K–150K filter rules),
the greedy algorithm requires no more than 40 seconds. This
enables a near real-time dynamic filter rule re-distribution for
large numbers of VIF filters.
VI. PRACTICAL DEPLOYMENT AT IXP
VIF has a generic architecture designed for any transit
networks (e.g., Tier-1 or large Tier-2 ISPs); yet, as the first
deployment model, we suggest to deploy it in major Internet
exchange points (IXPs). In this section, we present why IXPs,
among other transit infrastructure, are the ideal places to
introduce our verifiable in-network filtering (§VI-A). We also
provide a deployment example of VIF at an IXP (§VI-B) and
then evaluate the effectiveness of VIF at IXPs against DDoS
attacks with two real attack source data (§VI-C). Finally, we
provide a simple cost analysis for deploying VIF service at an
IXP for filtering up to 500 Gb/s traffic (§VI-D).
A. Internet Exchange Points (IXPs)
IXPs are physical locations where multiple autonomous
systems (ASes) peer and exchange traffic and BGP routes.
Essentially, an IXP is a large layer-2 fabric and connects ASes
(e.g., ISPs, content providers, cloud providers) in close proxim-
ity. IXPs provide great convenience to ASes in making peering
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Fig. 10: Deployment example of VIF at IXP.
relationship with many (e.g., hundreds or thousands) other
ISPs without the hassle of individual bilateral agreements.
The Internet currently has more than 600 globally distributed
IXPs [3] and some large IXPs serve multi-Tera b/s traffic
volume, which is comparable to large Tier-1 ISPs [7], [15].
Recently, as more video content providers and large cloud
providers rely on IXPs for lower cost but faster transit of their
traffic, emerging value-added services are expected from IXPs;
e.g., application-specific peering, inbound traffic engineering,
wide-area server load balancing, and redirection through mid-
dleboxes [35]. New innovation for these value-added services
has been possible because IXPs have a flexible architecture
model (especially, compared to traditional transit networks,
such as ISPs). An IXP usually consists of a single data center
in a single physical facility; thus, software-based architecture
available for data centers can be easily adopted; see software-
defined IXPs [33]–[35].
Due to their topological centrality, however, IXPs un-
fortunately often suffer from collateral damage when other
networks are targeted by DDoS attacks [57]. Worse yet, IXPs
are sometimes directly targeted by DDoS attacks; see an attack
incident in 2016 against multiple IXPs: AMS, LINX, and DE-
CIX [14]. A traffic filtering service could easily be a natural
next value-added service for IXPs [23].
B. Deployment example at IXP
We consider the VIF IXP has a generic architecture that
includes a layer-2 switching fabric, a route server (which is
not highlighted in our paper), and a logical central controller
for software-defined switches [34], [35]. Figure 10 illustrates
a deployment example of VIF at an IXP. The filtering IXP
sets up one or more commodity servers with SGX support.
When a victim network is under DDoS attack, it contacts the
controller of the VIF IXP via an out-of-band channel.8 As
suggested in [58], the victim network can easily authenticate
to the IXP via Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [43].
The victim network asks the filtering IXP to create one or more
SGX filters and audits it by receiving the validation attestation
report(s). After being convinced that the filters have been set
up properly (i.e., the remote attestation is done), the victim
network establishes a secure channel with the enclaves (e.g.,
TLS channels) and submits the filtering rules. The load bal-
ancing algorithm at the IXP controller receives the rules from
8We assume this channel is available even when the victim network is under
attacks. ISPs traditionally have maintained out-of-band channels (e.g., external
email servers, telephone lines [51]) for inter-ISP communication.
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Fig. 11: The ratio of attack sources that are handled by the VIF
filters for the two attack source data. (∗): Top-n IXPs denote
the n largest IXPs in each of the five regions, see Table III in
Appendix H.
the filter parallelization (see Section IV-B) and accordingly
controls the switches to distribute traffic destined to the victim
network to the enclaved filters. The VIF IXP eventually learns
and analyzes all the rules in this step. Finally, the enclave
filters perform packet filtering based on the submitted rules
and forward the allowed traffic to the victim network.
C. Effectiveness of VIF at IXPs against DDoS Attacks
We analyze how much DDoS attack traffic can be filtered
by VIF at IXPs with two real attack source data: 3 million
vulnerable open DNS resolver IP addresses [72] and 250
thousand Mirai bot IP addresses [5].
Simulation setup. In our inter-domain routing simulation, we
use the CAIDA Internet measurement data with the inferred
AS business relationship [2] and the peering membership of
world-wide IXPs [3]. We randomly choose 1,000 Tier-3 ISPs
as the DDoS victims and consider that each victim receives
attack traffic from all the attack sources (e.g., open resolvers
and bots) in each case. To determine a traffic forwarding path
between autonomous systems (ASes), we assume that each
of them applies the following widely adopted BGP routing
policies in order [27], [29]: (1) the AS prefers customer links
over peer links and peer links over provider links; (2) the AS
prefers the shortest AS-path length route; and (3) if multiple
best paths exist, the AS uses the AS numbers to break the tie.
We assume that the victim network establishes VIF sessions
with several largest IXPs (e.g., the biggest IXPs in each of
the five regions, as shown in Table III, see Appendix H). We
compute the ratio of flows from the attack IP addresses to
the victim network that are handled by at least one of the
established VIF filters at the selected IXPs. A traffic flow is
said to be transited at an IXP if it traverses along an AS-path
that include two consecutive ASes that are the members of the
IXP.
Results. Figure 11 shows how many attack flows can be
effectively handled by the in-network filters if installed in some
large IXPs. The box-and-whisker plots show the distribution
of the ratio of handled attack IPs when Top 1–5 biggest IXPs
in the five regions (thus, 5–25 IXPs globally in total) perform
in-network filtering service for DDoS defense. In each plot,
the solid lines represent the first and the fourth quartile of the
data set and the ends of the whisker indicate the 5th- and 95th-
percentiles. Also, the red band inside the box represents the
median.
Even when a single IXP in each region (thus, total five
IXPs worldwide) adopts the VIF filters, the majority of both
attack sources (e.g., vulnerable resolvers, botnet) are handled
by the VIF IXPs. Approximately, 60% of attack mitigation is
expected for the median cases, and 70-80% mitigation can be
achieved for the top quarter cases. As more IXPs adopt the VIF
filters, even more effective mitigation is achieved. Particularly,
Top-5 IXPs per these regions appear to be sufficient enough to
offer more than 75% attack mitigation for the median cases,
and 80-90% of attack mitigation for the upper quarter cases.
D. Deployment Cost Analysis
Let us provide a ballpark estimate of the cost of deploying
VIF at an IXP to handle 500 Gb/s of traffic. Note that the 500
Gb/s filter capacity at a single IXP appears to be sufficient
because the attack volume at each IXP can be much lower than
the aggregated volume at the victim network. For instance, it
would require only a few VIF IXPs with similar capabilities to
mitigate the biggest DDoS attack ever recorded with 1.7 Tb/s
attack traffic [71].
Our experiment in Section V-B shows that a near full line-
rate performance of 10 Gb/s per server with four SGX cores
is easily achieved. Thus, to handle 500 Gb/s attack traffic, an
IXP needs to invest in 50 modest SGX-supporting commodity
servers, which would require only one or two server racks.
With a commodity server cost is approximately US$ 2,000,
the filtering IXP only needs to spend for one-time investment
for US$ 100K to offer an extremely large defense capability
of 500 Gb/s. The capital expenditure can be borne by the
member ASes (hundreds or thousands) and/or can be amortized
by the service fees if the filtering service is economically
compensated by the payment from the victims [58]. A rigorous
economic analysis of VIF operations in IXPs is out of the scope
of this paper and is left for future work.
VII. DISCUSSION
We discuss several commonly asked questions regarding
the designs and usages of the VIF system.
What if victim networks cause denial-of-service by block-
ing arbitrary packets? Malicious victim networks cannot
exploit VIF and launch new DoS attacks because filter rules
are first validated with RPKI.
Can victim networks exploit VIF? Even when it is not under
attack, an alleged DDoS-victim network can make use of VIF
to filter some flows and reduce its operating cost. Regardless
of the underlying motivation of VIF requests, however, we do
not see this as a serious threat to the VIF system model. First,
a VIF filtering network may also save its operating cost due to
the reduced upstream bandwidth usage. If not, a VIF filtering
network can always refuse to serve any VIF request. Second, a
victim network would request filtering of flows that otherwise
would be filtered by itself anyway. Third, if payment channels
exist between the two networks [58], this is not considered as
the abuse of the service but a legitimate outsourced filtering.
Incrementally deployable? Incremental deployability of new
services is a perennial problem in a global Internet. IXPs have
been recently highlighted as the practical Internet infrastructure
where emerging services can be deployed and used incremen-
tally [34], [35]. A VIF instance installed at even single IXP
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can readily help reduce DDoS traffic by the direct victims with
strong verifiability property.
Can VIF handle any DDoS attacks? We do not claim that
in-network filtering can handle all types of DDoS attacks.
VIF demonstrates that it can effectively handle volumetric
attacks. However, VIF may not be as equally effective against
non-volumetric attacks (e.g., application-layer attacks), and
thus we suggest that VIF is used as an additional layer of
defense mechanism, which is orthogonal to existing cloud-
based defense solutions.
What does a DDoS victim do when misbehavior is de-
tected? In VIF, we suggest two networks create a filtering
contract only between them. Therefore, any one of them
can abort the temporary contract whenever one party detects
misbehavior.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Network DDoS attacks and defenses have been extensively
studied in the last 2–3 decades [50]. Here, we summarize a few
categories of DDoS defenses and related projects.
A. In-network Filtering
The idea in-network filtering has been the core idea of
many DDoS mitigation proposals. There are two prominent ap-
proaches to implementation: dynamic filtering and capability-
based approaches. Dynamic filtering suggests that the destina-
tion ISP requests the ISPs on the forwarding paths to install
filter rules at the time of attack, for instance as proposed
in Pushback [47], D-WARD [49], AITF [9], StopIt [45].
Capability-based approaches embed capabilities in the packet
flows, which can be controlled by the destination hosts to au-
thorize flows in upstream, as proposed in SIFF [74], TVA [75],
and Portcullis [53].
Closest to our work is the recent SENSS defense architec-
ture by Ramanathan et al. [58]. SENSS proposes to install
DDoS-victim submitted filters at a small number of major
ISPs. Ramanathan et al. show that in-network filtering at only
four major ISPs in the US would have stopped the Dyn attack
happened in 2016 [77]. SENSS also suggests an automated
payment channel between a DDoS victim and a filtering ISP
so that the ISP can get compensation for the extra filtering
tasks. Although the idea is solid and evaluation is promising,
the SENSS proposal lacks the filtering verifiability and thus
allows several undetectable misbehaviors of the filtering ISPs.9
Unlike previous in-line filtering proposals, our system VIF
focuses on the highly desired but yet-unaddressed security
property for in-network filtering system, i.e., the verifiable
filter, and demonstrates its feasibility and scalability.
B. Network Function Virtualization with Trusted Hardware
We categorize some of them:
• Middleboxes: Various network middleboxes have been
tested with the SGX capability. TLS middleboxes [37], [52]
demonstrate that an SGX-protected middlebox can handle
thousands of TLS sessions without violating their end-to-
end encryption. ShieldBox [70] and Trusted Click [22]
9Ramanathan et al. [58] sketch a reputation-based mitigation, which can be
used together with our VIF proposal.
demonstrate that SGX can protect the Click modular router
to implement various trusted network functions. S-NFV [62]
also discusses general policy, data privacy issues of net-
work functions. LightBox [24] demonstrates the line-rate
performance for simple secure packet processing functions.
Snort-SGX [42] also demonstrates line-rate performance of
Snort 3 along with a DPDK network layer. SafeBricks [55]
implements a highly modularized and safe network function
architecture in the Intel SGX platform.
Our main contribution is not merely an integration of
a simple flow filter function and an SGX architecture but
more on addressing scalability and filter-rule violations
at network layer that are specific to verifiable in-network
filtering defense systems.
• Privacy-preserving systems: Several systems demonstrate
that SGX-based network functions can improve the privacy
of anonymity systems: SGX-protected Tor nodes [40], [65],
• Inter-domain routing: Also, several secure inter-domain
routing applications have been proposed to exploit the
security guarantees of Intel SGX [18], [41].
• Verifiable accounting: There also have been some proto-
type systems that enable the outsource network functions
to securely measure the amount of resources used for the
requested tasks (e.g., [69] in an SGX platform, [16] in a
TPM platform).
With VIF we investigate a unique design point of auditable
traffic filters. Particularly, our contribution of VIF is in the
design of auditable filters that can handle ever-growing large-
scale attack volume and complexity with the SGX support.
C. Cloud-based DDoS Mitigations
The predominant DDoS defense in practice today is an
overlay-based filtering approach, such as cloud-based scrub-
bing services, that performs outsourced filtering in a third-party
network on behalf of the DDoS victims (e.g., AWS-Shield [1],
Radware DefensePro [6]). Overlay-based filtering approaches
are popular particularly because they require no changes to
the current Internet architecture. Recent works have proposed
advances in such overlay filtering using middleboxes [28], [46]
and proposals have discussed large-scale filtering locally at
ISPs [25]. However, end users are not satisfied with the status
quo. Reports suggest that relying on third-party providers
centralizes the DDoS marketplace [28]; costs for small and
medium-size victims are high and services are left to the
discretion of large service providers [28], [73].
Unlike these proposals, VIF does not rely on the cloud or
the local victim network’s capability but directly establishes
filtering rules at the transit networks.
IX. CONCLUSION
In-network filtering has numerous known advantages over
other proposed DDoS defenses, but the deployment of any of
its variants has been stifled. Our proof of concept VIF system
addresses one of the core, but largely neglected, problems
of source filtering—lack of filtering verifiability—and demon-
strates that verifiable in-network filtering is indeed possible
with a practical hardware root of trust support. We hope that
our study renews discussion on the deployment of in-network
filtering in the IXPs and encourages more sophisticated yet
auditable filter designs, such as stateful firewalls.
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APPENDIX A
FLOW-AWARE FILTER DESIGN
We consider deterministic and non-deterministic filter rule
types:
• A deterministic filter rule defines a static {ALLOW, DROP}
decision for a specified flow; and
• A non-deterministic filter rule expresses only the static prob-
ability distribution (PALLOW, PDROP, where PALLOW+PDROP = 1)
for a specified flow and the final filter decision for each exact
flows is made by the VIF filter. We guarantee the connection-
preserving property in VIF filters so that all the packets in
a TCP/UDP flow are allowed or dropped together.
The execution of non-deterministic rules with the
connection-preserving property can be implemented in two
different ways:
• Hash-based filtering. For each incoming packet p, we
compute the cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA-256) of its five-
tuple bits and the enclave’s secrecy to make filtering decision
based on the given probability distribution. For example,
packet p is allowed if H(five-tuple-bits||secrecy) <
(2256 − 1)× pALLOW with H(·) =SHA-256; and
• Exact-match rule filtering. For each TCP/UDP connection,
the filter installs an exact-match rule with a filtering decision
randomly chosen based on the given probability distribution.
Note that the two design points have different advantages and
disadvantages. The hash-based filtering has a smaller memory
footprint for lookup table but it incurs per-packet additional
latency for cryptographic hash operations. In contrast, the
exact-match filter design tends to have shorter per-packet
processing time since it executes only one lookup but it
requires a larger memory footprint for lookup tables and adds
latency for frequent lookup table updates. We propose a hybrid
design where hash-based filtering is performed for new flows
until these new flows are installed with exact-match rules at
every rule update period (e.g., 5-40 seconds).
APPENDIX B
DYNAMIC TEST OF INTERMEDIATE ASES
A victim network finds and avoids suspicious ASes that
drop the VIF-allowed packets. Particularly, we utilize the well-
known BGP poisoning-based inbound rerouting techniques
(e.g., LIFEGUARD [39] and Nyx [66]) to reroute (or detour)
inbound traffic and avoid traversing any intermediate ASes for
a short period of time (e.g., a few tens of seconds). These
BGP poisoning-based rerouting technologies do not require
any inter-AS coordination and thus the victim network can
independently test if any intermediate ASes drop packets (even
without the VIF IXP’s agreement).
If misbehavior of an intermediate AS is detected by the
victim network, then the misbehaving AS can be avoided
for the extended period of time (at least during the VIF
session) for auditable filtering. Or, if the victim network
continuously witnesses that VIF-allowed packets are dropped
continuously when dynamically changing the inbound routes,
it may conclude that the VIF IXP itself has been misbehaving.
The victim network can then discontinue the VIF contract with
the VIF IXP at its discretion.
Note that we do not consider extremely adverse network
adversaries, such as dropping all the packets between the VIF
IXP and the victim network, which cannot be handled properly
by any possible defenses in the current Internet architecture.
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Minimize z
s.t. ∀p, q : z ≥ α(u k∑
i=1
yi,p + v
)
+
k∑
i=1
xi,qyi,q (3)
∀i : u ·
n∑
j=1
yi,j + v ≤M (4)
∀j :
k∑
i=1
xi,jyi,j ≤ G (5)
∀i :
n∑
j=1
xi,j = bi (6)
∀xi,j , yi,j : (1− yi,j)xi,j = 0 (7)
∀xi,j ≥ 0 and ∀yi,j ∈ {0, 1} (8)
Fig. 12: ILP formulation for the optimal rule distribution.
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Fig. 13: Throughput performance in packet-per-second for
varying packet sizes and 3,000 rules with three implementation
versions: (1) Native (no SGX), (2) SGX with full packet copy,
and (3) SGX with near zero copy.
APPENDIX C
ILP FORMULATION FOR MULTI-ENCLAVE OPTIMIZATION
Our goal is to fully utilize the available resource on n
enclaves in terms of the bandwidth and memory, without
triggering the performance degradation. Also, the load on each
enclave should be balanced, in order to reduce the chance of
any enclave getting closer to the limit of G or M . Hence,
the maximum Cj and maximum Ij should all be as small
as possible, as shown in Equation 3. Note that a constant
coefficient α is used to balance two maximums in the sum.
Because of the capacity limit of a single enclaved filter,
any filter should have less than M memory consumption
(Equation 4) and less than G bandwidth load (Equation 5).
Since bi is distributed to multiple filters, so their allocated
bandwidth with respect to rule i should sum up to the value
of bi (Equation 6). Two decision variables are not independent
since when yi,j = 0, xi,j should never be a positive value.
(Equation 7).
APPENDIX D
GREEDY ALGORITHM FOR SCALABLE FILTER DESIGN
The pseudocode in Algorithm 1 summarizes the greedy
algorithm we use for the filter rule distribution problem for
the scalable VIF filter design in Section IV-B.
Algorithm 1 Greedy algorithm for rule distribution and band-
width allocation
1: procedure GREEDYSOLVER(b1, b2, ...bk , M , G, λ, u, v)
2: B ← {b1, b2, ..., bk}, g ← 1n
∑k
i=1 bi, h← kn
3: while g ≤ G and h ≤ (M − v)/u do
4: X ←ASSIGNBANDWIDTH(B, h, g, n)
5: if X 6= ∅ then
6: return X
7: end if
8: g ← g + ∆g
9: if g > G then
10: h← h+ ∆h, g ← 1n
∑k
i=1 bi
11: end if
12: end while
13: end procedure
14: procedure ASSIGNBANDWIDTH(B, h, g, n)
15: X ← ∅, j ← 1
16: while B 6= ∅ and j ≤ n do
17: r ← g, c← 0 . c: remaining bandwidth for filter j; f : rule counter
18: while B 6= ∅ and c ≤ h do
19: bi ← PopMin(B)
20: if bi < r and j + 1 ≤ h then
21: xi,j ← bi, X ← X ∪ {xi,j}, c← c+ 1, r ← r − bi
22: continue
23: end if
24: B ← B ∪ {bi}, bi ← PopMax(B)
25: if bi ≤ r then
26: xi,j ← bi, X ← X ∪ {xi,j}, c← c+ 1, j ← j + 1
27: else
28: xi,j ← r, X ← X ∪ {xi,j}, bi ← bi − r, B ← B ∪ {bi}
29: end if
30: break
31: end while
32: end while
33: if B = ∅ then
34: return ∅
35: end if
36: return X
37: end procedure
APPENDIX E
ADDITIONAL EVALUATION OF THROUGHPUT
PERFORMANCE OF VIF
Figure 13 shows the throughput evaluation in packet per
second metric. Taking a closer look at the SGX with full packet
copy implementation, we notice that the maximum packet
processing rate is capped at roughly 6 Mpps, which suggests
the inherent capacity limit of the full packet-copy operations.
Unlike the full packet copy version, the near zero-copy version
shows no such throughput cap in terms of packet per second.
APPENDIX F
CONNECTION-PRESERVING FILTERING PERFORMANCE OF
VIF
As we discussed in Appendix A, the two mechanisms
for connection preservation (i.e., hash-based filtering, exact-
match rule based filtering) have different advantages and
disadvantages. Thus, we present a hybrid design for practical
operations. For any new flow that does not match any existing
exact-match filter rules, the filter allows/drops based on the
hash digest of the 5-tuple of the packets and queues this 5-
tuple. At every filter rule update (e.g., every 5 seconds)10, all
the newly received flows since the last update are converted
into exact-match rules and inserted to the lookup table. This
hybrid design amortizes the cost of lookup table update by
batch processing multiple newly observed flows at every
update period. Also, it limits the per-packet latency increase
10The rule update period can be synchronized with that of the rule re-
configuration for scalable, multiple enclave operations; see Section IV-B.
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TABLE II: Overhead of filter rule batch insertion to a multi-bit
trie lookup table.
Number of rules in a batch 1 10 100 1000
Insert time (millisecond) 50 52 53 75
due to hash operations since newly observed flows should
be the minority in general. Indeed, our experiments on the
performance overhead of the use of hash-based filtering with
various packet sizes show no performance degradation, except
with small packet size.
Figure 14 shows our experiment on the performance over-
head of the use of hash-based filtering for varying fraction
of incoming packets. Particularly, when the ratio of hashed
packets is low (e.g., < 10 %), we observe no performance
degradation in all packet sizes, except the smallest size (i.e.,
64 Byte) where up to 25% throughput degradation is measured.
We argue that this performance degradation is easily acceptable
because in general, the fraction of newly observed flows within
a short period (e.g., 5 seconds) would be small. Moreover, the
64-Byte performance degradation in Figure 14 must be the
lower-bound result since it assumes that all the packets are 64
Byte short packets.
Table II shows the benchmark on the time taken to insert
the batched new exact-match rules to a multi-bit tri-based
lookup table. Our test shows that the batch insertion of
filter rules is quite efficient and incurs minimal performance
overhead even for large batch size; e.g., only 75 milliseconds
compared to the 5-second rule update period.
APPENDIX G
REMOTE ATTESTATION PERFORMANCE
VIF performs remote attestation for each new enclave that
the VIF IXP launches on its infrastructure. Since VIF is ex-
pected to operate under DDoS attacks, we want to ensure that
the launching of multiple-enclaves on demand does not become
the bottleneck for our deployment model. Here, we measure
the total amount of time to complete an end-to-end remote
attestation process for one enclave. In our micro-benchmark
for remote attestation for the conservative performance tests,
we set up the filter enclave and the destination on a cloud
machine hosted in South Asia, and the IAS service hosted in
Ashburn, Virginia, United States. For an enclave binary of size
1 MB, the platform takes 28.8 milliseconds and the total end-
to-end latency of 3.04 seconds with a standard deviation of
9.2 milliseconds.
APPENDIX H
TOP REGIONAL IXPS
We use the IXP peering membership from CAIDA [3] to
count the number of AS members of each IXP and summarize
the top five IXPs in each of five regions (Europe, North
America, South America, Asia Pacific and Africa) in Table III.
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TABLE III: Top five IXPs in each of the five regions. Numbers inside the parentheses denote the member sizes of the IXPs.
Rank Europe North America South America Asia Pacific Africa
1 AMS-IX (1660) Equinix Ashburn (598) IX.br Sa˜o Paulo (2082) Equinix Singapore (504) NAPAfrica Johannesburg (506)
2 DE-CIX (1494) Any2 (557) PTT Porto Alegre (258) Equinix Sydney (393) NAPAfrica Cape Town (258)
3 LINX Juniper (755) SIX (462) PTT Rio de Janeiro (246) Megaport Sydney (383) JINX (180)
4 EPIX Katowice (732) TorIX (426) CABASE-BUE (183) BBIX Tokyo (286) NAPAfrica Durban (122)
5 LINX LON1 (697) Equinix Chicago (384) PTT Curitiba (140) HKIX (281) IXPN Lagos (69)
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